I am on vacation next week. The Electric will be dark next Sunday, Aug. 14, and return Aug. 21.

As China has increasingly bolstered its lead in the global electric vehicle and battery race, it has seemed as though the U.S. is standing still: While Chinese companies have added every more battery manufacturing capacity, U.S. automakers and Washington have seemed prepared to simply rely on access to the Chinese supply. On Sunday, though, the U.S. Senate passed a bill that, if approved this week by the House, will authorize tens of billions of dollars to build a U.S. battery supply chain. This week, we look at the dramatic U.S. turnaround, and flaws in the effort.

In the 1990s, the Clinton administration embarked on a daring geopolitical operation: With Russia weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. put its weight behind the construction of a 1,100-mile pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. The idea offered a three-way win: U.S. and other Western oil companies would gain access to some of the world’s richest untapped oil fields; the former Soviet states surrounding the Caspian Sea—collectively known as the ’Stans—would achieve more independence from Russia; and the U.S. would gain influence along the southern flank of its former chief geopolitical rival. In 2006, the line was finally completed despite bitter Russian opposition, marking an unusual achievement of diplomacy and commerce.

I was a correspondent in the ’Stans through much of this period, and I can tell you that very few people thought the Baku-Mediterranean pipeline would succeed. Most observers said it was too expensive and too technologically challenging. Clinton administration officials, however, insisted that the oil companies build the line, and they finally did. The lesson was that in high-stakes geopolitics, there is a lot to be said for setting a high bar and sticking to it.